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Introduction
On August 30, 2007, China took a momentous step by adopting its
anti-monopoly law (AML).1 The main goals of the AML are to prevent
monopolistic conduct, protect fair competition, enhance economic effi-
ciency, protect consumer and public interest, and promote healthy growth
in China’s socialist market economy.2 Adopted decades after China began
its transformation from a centrally-planned economy into a free-market
economy, the AML represents an attempt to create a coherent and compre-
hensive approach to promoting the competition that is essential to a prop-
erly functioning market economy.3 The adoption of the AML was very
contentious due to the competing incentives of reining in the monopolistic
power of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and retaining absolute control in
certain critical sectors of the economy.4
On August 1, 2013, the Shanghai High Court ruled in Johnson & John-
son v. Rainbow that the manufacturer Johnson & Johnson had violated the
1. See Bruce M. Owen et al., China’s Competition Policy Reforms: The Anti-Monopoly
Law and Beyond, 75 ANTITRUST L. J. 231, 232 (2008).
2. Jiangxiao Athena Hou & Jane Yi, A Progress Report on the Implementation of
China’s Anti-Monopoly Law, 20 COMPETITION: J. ANTITRUST & UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW
SECTION STATE BAR CAL. 79 (2011).
3. See Owen, supra note 1. R
4. See id. at 244. These competing objectives create a unique tension that other
countries, like the United States, do not have to face.
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AML by agreeing on a resale price maintenance (RPM) system with several
distributors.5 Johnson & Johnson was a case of first impression regarding
the treatment of vertical price-fixing agreements, specifically RPMs, under
the AML.6 Vertical price-fixing agreements arise when a manufacturer
decides to limit the degree and nature of competition among its dealers.7
RPMs occur when a manufacturer fixes a minimum or maximum price at
which the dealers can resell the product.8
Decided on the sixth anniversary of the AML’s adoption,9 Johnson &
Johnson may hint at how China will apply the AML to vertical price-fixing
in cases. However, uncertainty remains in this area because court decisions
are not binding in China.10 Furthermore, while the Chinese AML makes it
clear that horizontal price-fixing agreements are per se illegal, it is silent as
to whether the per se rule will govern the analysis of vertical price-fixing
agreements.11
The National Development Reform Commission (NDRC), a Chinese
administrative agency that is analogous to the Federal Trade Commission,
has taken the strict liability or per se approach when dealing with RPMs.12
However, the Shanghai High Court applied a more factor-based “rule of
reason” approach in Johnson & Johnson.13 Whether China will implement
the per se or the rule of reason approach when dealing with RPMs is criti-
cal, as it will have a huge impact on manufacturer-dealer relationships as
well as consumer welfare in China’s rapidly expanding economy.
The contentious history regarding the treatment of vertical price-fixing
and RPMs in the United States may serve as valuable guidance for Chinese
lawmakers and judges.14 Long ruled to be per se illegal under Section 1 of
the Sherman Antitrust Act,15 RPMs are now analyzed under the rule of
reason analysis in the United States.16 The Supreme Court’s 2007 decision
to reverse almost 100 years of precedent and apply the rule of reason to
5. See Susan Ning et al., China: Chinese court rendered final judgment on Rainbow v.
Johnson & Johnson –  the first antitrust private action of vertical monopolistic agreement,
MONDAQ (Aug. 8, 2013), http://www.mondaq.com/x/256400/Cartels+Monopolies/Chi
nese+court+rendered+final+judgment+on+Rainbow+v+Johnson+Johnson+the+first+anti
trust+private+action+of+vertical+monopolistic+agreement.
6. See id.
7. See ROBERT PITOFSKY ET AL., TRADE REGULATION 606 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds.,
6th ed. 2010).
8. See id.
9. See Ning, supra note 5.
10. See Shanghai Court Applies “Rule of Reason” in Vertical Price Maintenance Case,
(Sept. 9, 2013), available at http://www.dentons.com/en/insights/alerts/2013/septem
ber/9/shanghai-court-applies-rule-of-reason [hereinafter Shanghai Court].
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See Owen, supra note 1, at 237 (stating that countries transitioning from cen- R
trally planned economies to market economies often look to western countries for gui-
dance in designing their competition policies).
15. See Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 408 (1911),
overruled by Leegin Creative Leather Prod., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007).
16. See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 881.
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RPMs in Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc. continues to be
very controversial.17 While there are compelling arguments for both sides, I
will argue that China should follow American antitrust law— specifically
the standard set by Leegin— and implement the rule of reason analysis for
RPM agreements.
In making my argument, I will analyze the respective justifications
behind the per se and rule of reason methods of analysis for vertical price-
fixing. The evolution of American courts’ attitudes toward vertical price-
fixing has produced valuable guidelines for how this kind of behavior
should be treated in China. Other important factors include the challenges
that China still faces today, over thirty years after it began the transition
from a centrally-planned economy to a market economy, in determining
what kinds of rules fit best within its framework of a free-market economy
with a dose of heavy government influence. In an attempt to answer this
question, I will break down the unique economic, regulatory, and legal
contexts within which the AML exists. Then, I will show why the rule of
reason is the best standard to apply to vertical price-fixing in China’s
unique market.
Background
China adopted the AML on August 30, 2007 to regulate competition in
its relatively young free-market economy.18 On August 1, 2013, the Shang-
hai High Court issued its first ruling on the legality of vertical price-fixing
under the AML in Johnson & Johnson.19 Johnson & Johnson specifically dealt
with resale RPMs, a form of vertical price-fixing where the manufacturer
and a distributor agree on a maximum or minimum price that consumers
will pay to buy the product from the distributor.20 In overruling the deci-
sion of a lower court, the Shanghai High Court applied a rule of reason
approach and concluded that Johnson & Johnson’s resale price mainte-
nance practices violated China’s AML.21
Because court decisions are not binding in China, the Johnson & John-
son case is only the first step in determining how RPMs will ultimately be
viewed under China’s AML.22 China’s National Development Reform Com-
mission has taken a per se approach to analyzing RPMs.23 The per se and
rule of reason approaches have been so divergent in the United States that
the choice of one approach over the other will usually determine the out-
17. See Christopher S. Kelly, Leegin Creative Leather Prod., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.: The
Final Blow to the Use of Per Se Rules in Judging Vertical Restraints— Why the Court Got it
Wrong, 28 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 593 (2008).
18. See Owen, supra note 1. R
19. See Ning, supra note 5. R
20. See id.; see also Jordan A. Dresnick & Thomas A. Tucker Ronzetti, Vertical Price
Agreements in the Wake of Leegin v. PSKS: Where Do We Stand Now?, 64 U. MIAMI L. REV.
229 (2009).
21. See Shanghai Court, supra note 10.
22. See id.
23. See id.
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come of an antitrust case.24  Thus, the difference between the respective
methods of analysis for the courts and the agencies presents a critical ques-
tion of whether vertical price-fixing, specifically RPMs, should be analyzed
under the per se or rule of reason approach.
I. Per Se v. Rule of Reason in American Antitrust Law: A General
Overview
The issue of whether the court should apply per se analysis or rule of
reason analysis is paramount in any case involving the Sherman Antitrust
Act because it determines what kinds of defenses are available to the defen-
dant. There is a very fine line separating these two methods of analyses, so
courts sometimes have difficulty deciding which one to use. However,
courts have set out some key principles that will provide valuable guide-
lines to this question in the century after the enactment of the Sherman
Antitrust Act.
A. Per Se Rule
Courts apply the per se rule when the practices in question are obvi-
ously detrimental to competition and lack any redeeming value.25 When
applying the per se rule, the court will not consider defenses based on pro-
competitive or necessity justifications.26 Thus, one need not show actual
anti-competitive effects for a finding of the agreement’s illegality.27 One of
the earliest benchmarks with regard to the application of the per se rule was
that all “naked restraints,” or agreements solely designed for the purpose of
restraining trade or competition, were illegal per se.28 In United States v.
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., the defendant piping contractors met in advance
to determine the price of the winning bid for piping contracts.29 The
Eighth Circuit ruled that the agreement between piping companies to des-
ignate one member to win bids for public contracts fell under the scope of
Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act and was thus illegal.30 In reaching
this decision, the Court distinguished “naked restraints,” which are illegal
per se because they have no pro-competitive purpose, from “ancillary
restraints,” which help implement the pro-competitive effects of an under-
24. See Edward D. Cavanagh, The Rule of Reason Re-Examined, 67 BUS. LAWYER 435,
436 (2012).
25. Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Reconciling the Per Se and Rule of Reason Approaches to
Antitrust Analysis, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 685, 691 (1991).
26. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 218 (1940)
(“For over forty years this Court has consistently and without deviation adhered to the
principle that price-fixing agreements are unlawful per se under the Sherman Act and
that no showing of so-called competitive abuses or evils which those agreements were
designed to eliminate or alleviate may be interposed as a defense.”).
27. See id.
28. See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 278– 79 (6th Cir.
1898).
29. See id. at 272.
30. See id. at 291.
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lying cooperative agreement.31 The defendant’s agreement constituted a
naked restraint because it served no other purpose than to restrain compe-
tition between piping contractors.32
B. Rule of Reason
The rule of reason, on the other hand, is more flexible and requires a
deeper economic analysis of the agreement.33 This analysis is more of a
general inquiry into whether, under all circumstances, the challenged prac-
tices impose an unreasonable restraint on competition.34 When applying
the rule of reason analysis, the court takes into account the market power
of the defendants, the purpose of the agreement, and the actual effects of
the agreement.35 Thus, even if an agreement seems like it restrains compe-
tition, the defendants can justify the agreement by showing that, under the
totality of the circumstances, the pro-competitive justifications for the
agreement outweigh the agreement’s actual anti-competitive harm.36
In Bd. of Trade of Chicago v. United States, the defendants agreed to fix
the price of grain from a certain time in the afternoon until the beginning
of the next business day.37 The Supreme Court applied the rule of reason
and said that “[t]he true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is
such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or
whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition.”38 The
Court found the defendant’s conduct to be legal under the rule of reason
analysis after analyzing the purpose, scope, and effect factors.39 The pur-
pose of the restraint was to restrict the period of the price making, and not
the price making itself.40 The scope of the restraint dealt with the portion
of the market that was actually affected.41
C. Benefits of Each
The main benefits of the per se rule are clarity and predictability for
both the courts and for potential defendants.42 Applying the per se analysis
draws clear bright-line rules as to whether specific conduct is illegal or
not.43 These clear distinctions allow for quick decisions with low adminis-
trative costs.44 Because the court is not concerned with analyzing the eco-
nomic effects of the agreement, it can quickly dispose of the central
31. See Piraino, Jr., supra note 25, at 688. R
32. See Addyston, 85 F. at 291.
33. See HOLMES & MANGIARACINA, ANTITRUST LAW HANDBOOK § 2:10.
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 237 (1918).
38. See id. at 244.
39. See id. at 245.
40. See id. at 239.
41. See id.
42. See Cavanagh, supra note 24, at 445.
43. See id. It is especially important for a clear rule in the price-fixing realm, where
an antitrust violation can lead to criminal sanctions and treble damages.
44. See id.
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question. With the per se rule, jury trials will be few and far between, and
the trials that do come about will be quick. Furthermore, the per se rule
will have a greater deterrent effect because there is a very low chance that
an agreement in restraint of competition will slip through the cracks and be
ruled legal. However, this increased deterrence could be detrimental, as it
might stop companies from employing lawful business tactics for fear of
liability.45
Rule of reason analysis removes this risk of over-deterrence by
allowing courts to take a deeper look into the purpose and effect of the
agreement. Using the rule of reason will usually lead to a more thorough
and complete analysis of the economic effects of the alleged conduct. The
consequences of applying the rule of reason are decreased efficiency and
increased responsibility for judges to analyze the economic nuances of
agreements.46 There are concerns that forcing judges to use nuanced eco-
nomic principles to analyze antitrust cases would be akin to forcing them
to “set sail on a sea of doubt . . . .”47
II. Vertical Price-Fixing: Harms and Justifications
Vertical price-fixing involves an agreement between parties at different
levels of a product distribution chain to maintain the price of certain goods
or services as they move through the chain.48 These agreements are usually
referred to as Resale Price Maintenance (RPMs).49 Modern economic anal-
ysis shows that there are both anti-competitive effects, and pro-competitive
justifications for RPMs.50
A. Anti-competitive Effects
The main concern with vertical price-fixing and RPMs is that such
agreements may act to facilitate cartels at the distributor level.51 The manu-
facturer’s minimum resale price will have the same effect as an agreement
between distributors to fix prices at that level.52 However, because the
price was actually fixed by the unilateral action of a manufacturer, the dis-
tributors who benefit from the uniformly fixed price may avoid liability
under Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act because there is technically
no contract, combination, or conspiracy between the distributors in
45. See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 895. (The possibility of over-deterrence is a logical infer-
ence that can be made from the nature of the per se rule as described).
46. See Cavanagh, supra note 24, at 445 (stating that the per se rule is superior to the
rule of reason in promoting efficiency and ease of administration).
47. Addyston, 85 F. at 284.
48. See Christopher J. Pettit, In Sharp Contrast to the Past: The Demise of the Per Se
Rule Against Vertical Price Fixing, 22 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1075, 1075 (1991).
49. See William S. Comanor, Vertical Price-Fixing, Vertical Market Restrictions, and
the New Antitrust Policy, 98 HARV. L. REV. 983, 984 (1985).
50. See PITOFSKY ET AL., supra note 7, at 607– 08. R
51. See id. at 607.
52. See id.
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restraint of trade.53
Another concern is that RPMs will act to stabilize retailer prices at the
manufacturer-set level.54 RPMs will take away the ability of distributors to
offer price concessions to increase sales volume.55 The absence of distribu-
tor price-cutting will stabilize the manufacturer’s price level because it
removes an important pressure on manufacturers to cut prices in order to
gain a larger market share.56 Because RPMs arguably diminish manufac-
turer incentives to cut price in order to compete, they can have similar
effects to a horizontal agreement between retailers to fix prices at a certain
level.57
B. Pro-competitive Effects
Proponents of using the rule of reason to analyze RPMs point out that
RPMs can have pro-competitive justifications that do not exist under hori-
zontal price-fixing schemes.58 Thus, the idea that RPMs should be ana-
lyzed under the per se rule by analogy is faulty because the courts have
“expressed reluctance to adopt per se rules with regard to ‘restraints
imposed in the context of business relationships where the economic
impact of certain practices is not immediately obvious.’”59 One pro-com-
petitive factor for RPMs is the promotion of inter-brand competition.60 A
uniform price for a manufacturer’s product across a series of distributors
would force companies to compete on factors other than price.61 Because
manufacturers are concerned about losing business with distributors to
other brands who undercut their resale price, distributors can depend on
manufacturers to set a reasonable and efficient resale price minimum.
Another pro-competitive factor to be taken into account is the induce-
ment of distributors to include desired services that would boost sales.
Some examples of desired services are dealer demonstrations and post-sale
warranty programs.62 Some of these services are highly valued by custom-
ers and would help increase the manufacturer’s sales volume.63 Dealers,
however, often do not provide these services for fear of the “free rider”
problem. When a distributor offers a desired service, such as a dealer dem-
53. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). Section 1 only covers contracts, combinations, or con-
spiracies in restraint of trade. Id. A unilateral decision does not constitute an unlawful
restraint of trade under section 1. See United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300,
304– 05 (1919).
54. See David F. Shores, Vertical Price-Fixing and the Contract Conundrum: Beyond
Monsanto, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 377, 386 (1985).
55. See Pitofsky et al., supra note 7, at 607. R
56. See id.
57. See Shores, supra note 54, at 386.
58. See Pitofsky et al., supra note 7, at 607. R
59. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997).
60. See Pitofsky et al., supra note 7, at 607. R
61. See id.
62. See Gregory T. Gundlach et al., Free Riding and Resale Price Maintenance: Insights
from Marketing Research and Practice, 55 ANTITRUST BULL. 381, 386 (2010), available at
http://www.unf.edu/~ggundlac/pdfs/FreeRidingPriceMaintenance.pdf.
63. See id.
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onstration, it has to raise the price of the product because of the associated
costs.64 Distributors who do not provide these desired services are often
able to undercut the distributors who do offer these services.65 The free
rider problem arises when consumers take advantage of these dealer dem-
onstrations to obtain valuable information, but then buy the products from
the distributor who has the lower prices.66 RPMs can offset the free rider
problem by setting a price floor that discount distributors cannot under-
cut. By offsetting the free rider problem, RPMs can provide more incentives
for distributors to provide these desired services, which would then boost
manufacturer sale volumes.67
III. The History of Resale Price Maintenance in the United States:
From Per Se to Rule of Reason
A. Dr. Miles: Retail Price Maintenance Schemes Per Se Illegal
For almost a century, courts followed Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D.
Park & Sons Co., which held that RPMs were per se illegal.68 Plaintiff Dr.
Miles Medical Company (Dr. Miles) used a secret formula to manufacture
proprietary medicines and sold the products through dealers at the whole-
sale level.69 Each sale Dr. Miles made included two restrictive agreements,
which had the effect of fixing minimum resale prices at the retail and
wholesale levels.70 The defendant, John D. Park & Sons Company (Parks),
a wholesaler of medicines, refused to enter into the required contracts
imposed by Dr. Miles.71 Instead, Parks obtained Dr. Miles’s medicine by
purchasing it from other stores that sold the medicine at a cut price in
violation of Dr. Miles’s agreement.72
The issue was whether Dr. Miles had the right to restrict the prices at
which its dealers could sell its medicine by virtue of being the manufac-
turer of the medicine.73 Justice Hughes ruled that Dr. Miles’s restrictions
were illegal, stating that “agreements or combinations between dealers,
having for their sole purpose the destruction of competition and the fixing
of prices, are injurious to the public interest and void. They are not saved
by the advantages which the participants expect to derive from the
64. See id.
65. See id. at 385.
66. See id. at 386.
67. See id. at 389.
68. See Pitofsky et al., supra note 7, at 610. R
69. See Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 374, overruled by Leegin, 551 U.S. at 877.
70. See id.
71. See id. at 394.
72. See id.
73. See id. at 383; PITOFSKY ET AL., supra note 7, at 611. Dr. Miles first tried to argue R
that the court should analogize its secret formula to patent rights. Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at
401. The Court rejected that argument, saying that there is a public interest in maintain-
ing the free trade of a final product even if there is a monopoly in production. Dr. Miles
then contended that it was entitled to add conditions to the resale of its medicines by
virtue of its right to dispose of its property as pleased. The Court rejected this argument
as well, reasoning that the restraint on alienation is ordinarily invalid.
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enhanced price to the consumer.”74 In doing so, he likened this vertical
restraint to a horizontal restraint, and said such a vertical restraint would
have the same effect as a situation in which Dr. Miles and a wholesaler
enter into a combination to establish a minimum resale price.75 The Court
rejected Dr. Miles’s argument that the restraints were important to protect
against the damage and confusion that would be caused by lower prices,
and the Court characterized the damages suffered as “an inability to allow
its favored dealers to realize increased profits brought about by the price
restraints.”76
Even though the Supreme Court never stated in Dr. Miles that vertical
price-fixing agreements are per se unlawful under Section 1 of the Sherman
Antitrust Act, subsequent courts viewed that conclusion as a logical infer-
ence.77 Thus, for almost a hundred years after the decision, courts have
read Dr. Miles to establish the rule that vertical price-fixing, specifically
RPMs, was per se illegal under Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.78
B. Colgate: Setting a Limit on the Per Se Rule with the Bi-Lateral/
Unilateral Distinction
Because Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act only prohibited con-
certed action, there remained the question of whether an RPM constitutes a
“contract, combination, or conspiracy” under Section 1, or if it was simply
a unilateral refusal to deal.79 One party’s unilateral refusal to deal with
another party is not a violation under Section 1.80 The Supreme Court
tackled this issue in United States v. Colgate & Co.81
Defendant Colgate manufactured soap and toiletry items and distrib-
uted them through sales to wholesale and retail distributors.82 The govern-
ment alleged that Colgate “knowingly and unlawfully created and engaged
in a combination with . . . wholesale and retail dealers . . . for the purpose
and with the effect of procuring adherence on the part of such dealers to
resale prices fixed by the defendant . . . .”83 The government, however,
never alleged that Colgate had entered into contracts or combinations with
retailers to fix prices.84 Nonetheless, the government maintained that the
74. See Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 408.
75. See id.
76. See PITOFSKY ET AL., supra note 7, at 612. R
77. See id. at 648.
78. See id. at 612. Federal enforcement of the per se rule against vertical price-fixing
schemes was almost non-existent until the 1980s because of academic criticism of the
rule. May need citation.
79. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1890).
80. See Kathryn A. Kusske, Refusal to Deal as a Per Se Violation of the Sherman Act:
Russell Stover Attacks the Colgate Doctrine, 33 AM. U. L. REV. 463, 463 (1984). Note that
a refusal to deal may be a violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act when it
relates to monopolization or attempted monopolization. See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1890).
81. See United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 304– 05 (1919).
82. See id. at 302.
83. See id.
84. See id. at 304– 05. Rather, the allegations stated that Colgate refused to sell to
retailers who would not adhere to the process. See Dresnick, supra note 20, at 232. .
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allegations adequately charged the defendant for entering into an unlawful
combination within the Dr. Miles doctrine.85
The issue was whether Colgate’s practices constituted a violation of
Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.86 The Court rejected the govern-
ment’s contentions and held that Colgate’s practices only constituted a uni-
lateral refusal to deal with retailers who did not adhere to their minimum
resale prices.87 The Court noted that, in the absence of a purpose to create
or maintain a monopoly, the Sherman Act does not restrict a manufac-
turer’s right to freely exercise independent discretion about retailers to
which the manufacturer will sell goods and make contracts.88
Thus, the court effectively carved out an exception to the Dr. Miles
doctrine89 by distinguishing unlawful bi-lateral price-fixing, present in Dr.
Miles, from the lawful unilateral refusal to deal, found in Colgate.90 With-
out proof of an agreement between two parties, a party’s unilateral refusal
to deal does not violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act, as Section 1 only
reaches “contracts, combinations, or conspiracies.”91
C. Leegin: Doing Away With the Per Se Rule
However, in 2007, the Supreme Court overturned almost one hundred
years of precedent in applying the per se rule to vertical price restraints and
held that courts should apply the rule of reason instead in Leegin Creative
Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.92 Defendant Leegin Creative Leather Prod-
ucts, Inc. (Leegin) designed and manufactured leather products under the
brand name “Brighton.”93 Plaintiff PSKS, Inc. (PSKS) operated Kay’s
Kloset, a women’s apparel store in Texas that formerly sold Brighton prod-
ucts.94  In 1997, Leegin decided to implement the “Brighton Retail Pricing
and Promotion Policy.”95 Under this policy, Leegin would refuse to sell to
any retailer that discounted Brighton goods below Leegin’s suggested
amount.96 In 2002, Leegin discovered that Kay’s Kloset had been marking
85. See Colgate, 250 U.S. at 306.
86. See id.
87. See Dresnick, supra note 20, at 232.
88. See Colgate, 250 U.S. at 306.
89. See Kusske, supra note 80, at 468– 69.
90. See id. at 489. Dr. Miles’s practices were characterized as bi-lateral because he
entered into contracts with the wholesale and retail distributors to maintain the mini-
mum resale price. Colgate, on the other hand, never entered into contracts dictating a
minimum floor resale price with distributors. Rather, they were charged with refusing to
deal with those who refused to maintain their minimum resale price. Thus, Colgate’s
decision was unilateral.
91. See id.
92. See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 899.
93. See id. at 882.
94. See id. Once Kay’s Kloset started selling Brighton products, they would promote
Brighton products by running Brighton advertisements and holding “Brighton days” in
the store. Consequently, Kay’s Kloset became the go to destination for Brighton products
in the area.
95. See id. at 883.
96. See id. Leegin explained its reasoning for implementing this policy by saying: “In
this age of mega stores like Macy’s, Bloomingdales, May Co. and others, consumers are
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\47-2\CIN206.txt unknown Seq: 12  9-OCT-14 14:29
484 Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 47
down Brighton products below the suggested retail prices.97 After Kay’s
Kloset refused Leegin’s request to stop the discounts, Leegin stopped sell-
ing its products to Kay’s Kloset.98
PSKS sued Leegin, alleging that Leegin had violated antitrust laws by
“enter[ing] into agreements with retailers to charge only those prices fixed
by Leegin.”99 At trial, Leegin defended on the basis that its practices
merely constituted a unilateral refusal to deal and was thus lawful under
Section 1 of the Sherman Act.100  Leegin also tried to introduce expert tes-
timony describing the pro-competitive effects of its arrangement, but the
court applied the per se rule established in Dr. Miles and excluded the testi-
mony because per se analysis does not take pro-competitive justifications
into account.101 The jury found for PSKS and awarded PSKS $1.2 million
in damages.102
On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, Leegin adopted a new argument. Leegin
no longer disputed that it had entered into a vertical price-fixing scheme
with its retailers.103 Rather, it argued that such agreements should be ana-
lyzed under the rule of reason.104 The Fifth Circuit rejected Leegin’s argu-
ment and held Dr. Miles governed the instant case “[b]ecause the
[Supreme] Court has consistently applied the per se rule to [vertical mini-
mum price-fixing].”105 Thus, the Fifth Circuit decided that the lower court
did not abuse its discretion by excluding testimony from Leegin’s eco-
perplexed by promises of product quality and support of product which we believe is
lacking in these large stores. Consumers are further confused by the ever popular sale,
sale, sale, etc. We, at Leegin, choose to break away from the pack by selling [at] specialty
stores; specialty stores that can offer the customer great quality merchandise, superb
service, and support the Brighton product 365 days a year on a consistent basis. We
realize that half the equation is Leegin producing great Brighton product and the other
half is you, our retailer, creating great looking stores selling our products in a quality
manner.” Id. Thus, it is apparent that Leegin adopted the policy to give retailers suffi-
cient margins to provide the customer service, which was essential to the promotion of
the Brighton Brand.
97. See id. at 884.
98. See id.
99. See id.
100. See id. Unilateral refusals to deal fall under the Colgate exception and are not
subject to the per se analysis that Dr. Miles set out for vertical price-fixing. See Dr. Miles,
220 U.S. at 408, overruled by Leegin, 551 U.S. at 877; Colgate, 250 U.S. at 304– 05.
101. See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 884.
102. See id. The Court trebled the damages pursuant to the Sherman Act. Citation
needed: will probably find needed cites for FN 102, and 104 in Leegin.
103. See id. at 885– 86.
104. See id. at 886. Leegin made three arguments as to why the rule of reason should
be applied. The court rejected all three arguments in affirming the district court’s deci-
sion. First, Leegin argued that the Supreme Court has applied the Per Se rule inconsis-
tently in the area of vertical price-fixing. The court rejected and said that it has applied
the Per Se rule consistently to vertical minimum RPMs. Leegin’s second argument was
that its pricing policy benefitted consumers and competition. The court rejected this
argument by pointing out that no such exception had been carved out under Per Se
analysis of vertical minimum RPMS. Finally, Leegin challenged the exclusion of expert
testimony regarding the pro-competitive effects. The court again rejected the argument,
saying that an economic expert’s testimony is irrelevant when the Per Se rule is applied.
See Kelly, supra note 17, at 612.
105. See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 886.
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nomic expert and upheld the lower court’s judgment.106
Leegin appealed again, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to
decide whether vertical minimum RPM agreements should continue to be
treated as per se unlawful according to Dr. Miles.107 The Court overruled
Dr. Miles, holding that vertical price restraints were to be analyzed under
the rule of reason, instead of the per se rule, from now on.108 The majority
pointed out that Courts have historically confined the per se rule to
restraints “that would always or almost always tend to restrict competition
and decrease output.”109 Accordingly, the per se rule is unfit for RPMs
because contemporary economic literature is “replete with procompetitive
justifications of a manufacturer’s use of a resale price maintenance.”110
The majority further reasoned that RPMs can have “either procompetitive
or anticompetitive effects, depending upon the circumstances in which
they are formed.”111 Thus, RPMs should be analyzed under the rule of rea-
son and not the per se rule because the economic impacts of a certain RPM
scheme are not immediately obvious.112
IV. China’s AML in the Context of the Chinese Economy’s
Transformation
A. Earlier Chinese Antitrust Laws
Prior to the enactment of the AML, China regulated competition
through a series of statutes and administrative rules.113 Some of these reg-
ulations, such as the Anti-Unfair Competition Law, were comprehensive
laws that contained provisions commonly found in antitrust laws around
the globe.114 Other specialized laws contained additional antitrust regula-
106. See id.
107. See id. In so framing the issue, the Court took direct aim at the precedential
value of Dr. Miles, which had sustained the per se illegality of vertical minimum price
restraints for almost a century. See Kelly, supra note 17, at 613.
108. See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 889.
109. Id. at 886.
110. See id. The Court went on to list pro-competitive effects of vertical price
restraints. One of these benefits is the elimination of free riding. The Court stated that
when a retailer provides auxiliary services such as decorated showrooms and first-hand
demonstrations, the manufacturer may experience the benefit through promotion of its
product. However, the retailer that provides these auxiliary services often incurs higher
costs and thus has to raise the price of the product. This opens the door for a discount
retailer to come in and undercut the auxiliary provider’s price. The free riding problem
arises when consumers go to the auxiliary provider to enjoy the demonstrations and
gather information, but ultimately buy the product from the discount retailer. A resale
price maintenance scheme can eliminate free riding by setting a price floor so that the
discounters cannot undercut and prices can auxiliary providers can effectively provide
the extra services.
111. Id. at 894.
112. See id. at 887 (noting that the court has expressed reluctance to adopt per se
rules with regard to restraints imposed in business relationship contexts, where the eco-
nomic impact of certain practices is not immediately obvious).
113. See Owen, supra note 1, at 232.
114. See id. at 233. The Anti-Unfair Competition law was more of a consumer protec-
tion law than an antitrust law. The law prohibited tie-in sales, price-fixing, and bid-
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tions.115 For example, the Commercial Banking Law of 1995 and the Price
Law of 1997 both contained provisions against improper competition and
improper pricing behaviors.116 Administrative rules provided more
detailed interpretations of previously promulgated laws and addressed
potential future issues that would likely require a quick response.117 How-
ever, these rules and statutes have not been effectively implemented, largely
because there is no clear enforcement mechanism.118
B. The AML: a Comprehensive Re-Tooling of Chinese Antitrust Law
with International Flavor
As a response to the fragmented state of existing antitrust law, China
began the process of developing a comprehensive law to consolidate all
aspects of antitrust law into a uniform set of rules in 1994.119 The need for
a comprehensive antitrust law can be traced back to 1978, when China
began its program of economic reform aimed at introducing market-based
principles to its centralized and state-run economy.120 China’s leadership
saw the need for comprehensive anti-monopoly legislation as a necessary
element of the legal system that would support this new market
economy.121
While the Ministry of Commerce emerged as the principal drafting
agency for the AML, many other governmental agencies also partici-
pated.122 In an attempt to draft an effective policy, strong foreign influence
in the drafting process came from consultations between drafting officials
and the U.S. Department of Justice, the FTC, the World Bank, and the
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.123 Indeed, China’s
AML is similar to U.S. antitrust statutes in its brevity and breadth.124 Thus,
interpretation and application of specific provisions of the AML are left to
subsequent interpretative regulations, as well as the decisions of enforce-
ment authorities such as courts or administrative agencies.125 New court
decisions with regards to vertical price-fixing are therefore very important,
rigging. It also addressed other issues which may have been more common in China
such as bribery, deceptive advertising, and coercive sales.
115. See id.
116. See id. at 234.
117. See id. For example, the NRDC, the Chinese analog to the FTC, issued the Provi-
sional Rules on Prevention of Monopoly Pricing in 2003. This administrative rule
addressed many unfair methods of competition.
118. See id.
119. See id. at 236.
120. Thomas R. Howell, et al., China’s New Anti-Monopoly Law: A Perspective from the
United States, 18 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 53, 55 (2009). These reforms emphasized enter-
prise autonomy, private ownership, and entrepreneurialism. Soon after, competition
among enterprises became widespread and intense, creating a need to reign in unfair
and destructive methods of competition. See id.
121. See id.
122. See id. at 56.
123. See id. Commentators believe that these extensive consultations with a wide
array of organizations resulted in substantial improvements in the AML.
124. See id. at 59.
125. See id.
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as the AML is silent as to how vertical-price-fixing should be treated.126
V. New Developments in China: Johnson & Johnson
On August 1, 2013, the Shanghai High Court issued the first decision
regarding treatment of vertical price-fixing and resale price maintenance
under the AML.127 In Johnson & Johnson, defendant Johnson & Johnson
entered into a contract with Rainbow Medical in 2008.128 The contract
granted Rainbow Medical the right to sell Johnson & Johnson products, but
contained a provision allowing Johnson & Johnson to set a minimum
price.129 Two months later, Rainbow Medical submitted a bid below the
minimum resale price to win a public bid to become the medical supplier
for a hospital.130 After Rainbow Medical refused Johnson & Johnson’s
requests to stop re-selling the products at such low prices, Johnson & John-
son broke relations with Rainbow Medical, eventually refusing to deal with
them outright.131 Rainbow Medical sued in August of 2010, claiming dam-
ages of 14 million RMB, or about $2.3 million USD, arising from Johnson
& Johnson’s RPM scheme.132
The first intermediate court, or trial court, dismissed the distributor’s
claims against defendant Johnson & Johnson’s RPM scheme because the
plaintiff distributor failed to prove harm to the competition through market
and product related evidence.133 Johnson & Johnson proved that there
were other suppliers who provided the same products; as a result, this prac-
tice did not harm competition.134 Even though the first intermediate court
applied the rule of reason, Johnson and Johnson’s RPM system was ruled
lawful.135
The Shanghai High Court reversed the decision; in doing so, the court
applied similar methods of analysis as the lower court.136 Rainbow still
had the burden of proof to show that Johnson and Johnson’s RPM created
an unreasonable restraint on trade.137 The Shanghai High Court consid-
ered the following factors: (1) the level of competition in the marketplace;
(2) the relative negotiating power of the parties; (3) the strength of the
brand; (4) the defendant’s market share; (5) the motivation of the defen-
dant in setting the price controls; and (6) any positive effect that the RPM
126. See Shanghai Court, supra note 10.
127. See id.
128. See Alexander C. Kaufman, Johnson & Johnson (JNJ) Loses Anti-Monopoly Case in
China, Ordered To Pay $85,800 To Local Dealer, INT’L BUS. TIMES, available at http://www
.ibtimes.com/johnson-johnson-jnj-loses-anti-monopoly-case-china-ordered-pay-85800-lo
cal-dealer-1368281.
129. See id.
130. See id.
131. See id.
132. See id.
133. See id.
134. See id.
135. See id.
136. See Shanghai Court, supra note 10.
137. See id.
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arrangement may have had on competition.138 The Shanghai High Court
found that these factors weighed in favor of the plaintiff, and ruled that
Johnson & Johnson’s RPM was unlawful under the AML.139
Analysis:Why China Should Apply the Rule of Reason for Future
Cases as Well
In arguing for the application of the rule of reason in future Chinese
RPM cases, I will stress the differences between vertical price restraints and
horizontal price restraints. Mainly, I will argue that there are too many pro-
competitive justifications for vertical price-restraints, specifically RPMs, to
dispose of them quickly and without an in depth analysis under the per se
rule. Furthermore, I will argue that the rule of reason still allows courts to
strike down vertical price restraints that have more anti-competitive than
pro-competitive effects. I will also argue that while the interests of effi-
ciency and of keeping judges from engaging in economic analysis are legiti-
mate, these arguments have lost strength over time. The interest of
accurately deciding whether an RPM is pro or anti-competitive must thus
override these other concerns.
In addition, a breakdown of the Chinese economy’s unique features
will also show that, while there are many differences between the Chinese
and U.S. economies, those differences do not affect what the primary goal
of antitrust law should be in both countries. In Part I, I will break down the
economic context of the AML by detailing China’s transformation from a
pure communist system to a free market economy. In Part II, I discuss the
regulatory context by framing it within the dual-mode strategy that China
adopted after 1978. In Part III, I discuss the flaws of China’s legal system
and how they will affect the implementation of the AML going forward. In
Part IV, I give an overview of the AML in the context of the Chinese eco-
nomic transformation. I will also compare and contrast the differing con-
texts in which U.S. antitrust law and Chinese antitrust law must operate,
arriving at the conclusion that both countries should focus on implement-
ing their respective laws to create a coherent regulatory framework. In Part
V, I will explain why applying the rule of reason to RPM schemes is the
correct regulatory approach for China.
I. China’s Economic Context: The Continuing Transformation
Free market competition is a relatively new phenomenon in China, as
the Chinese government (State) dominated the economy prior to 1978.140
China’s rapid transformation from a State-dominated economy to a free
market economy involved curtailing the previously unchecked State
Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and the emergence of the private sector. Com-
petition was very limited under the old system.141 In fact, the only form of
138. See id.
139. See id.
140. See Owen, supra note 1, at 238. R
141. See id.
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competition introduced under the old, State-dominated economy was
“labor competition” among production units.142
A. The Turning Point of 1992: Focus on the “Socialist Market
Economy”
Although economic reforms began in 1978, China did not make the
establishment of the “Socialist Market Economy” a central focus of eco-
nomic reforms until 1992.143 In the decade that followed, broad reforms
were undertaken to reconstruct many sectors of the Chinese economy,
including the SOE, taxation, banking, and foreign currency systems sec-
tors.144 As a result of these reforms, private enterprise grew to fill the gap
left by the reduction of SOEs.145 In addition, foreign investments began to
flow in, propelling these private enterprises to unprecedented rates of
growth.146
B. The Results and Unresolved Conflicts Left In the Wake of the
Revolution
Of the changes that came about after 1992, the most significant was
the relative decline of the SOEs and other State-controlled enterprises and
the reciprocal rise of the private sector.147 In 1978, 100% of enterprises in
China were State owned.148 A 2003 study showed that, as of 2001, only
56.2% of capital invested went toward what can still be categorized as a
“State-run” enterprise.149 However, these numbers do not point toward a
singular trend of disappearing SOEs. Despite the drop off in the influence
of SOEs, China has stayed true to the socialist part of the Socialist Market
Economy by preserving SOEs in many sectors of the economy.150 As a
matter of fact, 99% of private enterprises in China can be characterized as
small to medium sized enterprises.151 SOEs remain the largest enterprises
in China, concentrated mainly in important industries, such as electricity,
petroleum, railroads, aviation, telecommunications, and banking.152
The current structure of China’s economy presents an important ques-
142. See id. Promoting labor competition was both an attempt to make the State-run
economy more efficient and an effort to indoctrinate the general population with com-
munist ideology. The State emphasized that workers were to give their best efforts in
production because doing so would maximize benefits both for the country and for the
people.
143. See id. at 239. Deng Xiaoping, who was Mao Ze Dong’s successor and a revered
leader in his own right, initiated this policy change after conducting inspection tours of
China’s southern regions.
144. See id.
145. See id.
146. See id.
147. See id.
148. See id.
149. See id.
150. See id. at 240.
151. See id. at 239.
152. See id.
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tion regarding the role of SOEs in China’s economy.153 Are SOEs slowly
being phased out from the bottom up? Or are they permanent powerhouses
that are key features of the Socialist Market Economy? Determining the
importance of SOEs in China’s current economy necessitates a deeper
analysis of China’s regulatory and legal climates.
II. China’s Regulatory Context: Dual-Mode Regulation and the AML
A. Why Dual-Mode Regulation?
Transforming the fundamental principles of the Chinese economy
called for a transformation of the regulatory scheme as well.154 China’s
process of reform can be best summarized as follows:
Before China’s economic reforms, China’s economic system was modeled
after that of the former Soviet Union. For almost every major industry, a
corresponding ministry existed within the government to control, manage,
and coordinate production. There was no need for government ‘regulation,’
as the word is used in Western countries; the industries were already directly
owned and managed by the State. But when China began to reduce central
direction of its economy after the commencement of its economic reforms, it
faced the question of what industries to regulate, and how.155
In response to the shifting market conditions, China has chosen to treat
industry regulation in two ways.156
China has chosen relinquish its SOEs in “non-essential” areas such as
machinery, electronics, and textiles.157 The State, however, has chosen to
maintain or strengthen its grip in key sectors such as electricity, petroleum,
and banking.158 This “Dual-Mode” regulatory framework can be traced to
the coexisting policy interests of (1) promoting market competition by
eliminating unnecessary government interference; and (2) maintaining
influence in areas essential to national security and economic develop-
ment. As a result, China’s economic and regulatory policies both promote a
hybrid system where government coordination and SOEs co-exist and
thrive along with the market economy.
B. The AML and the Dual-Mode Regulatory State
The debate over what kind of pro-competitive policies are appropriate
for the Socialist Market Economy can be traced back to 1987, when the
153. See id. The answer to this question is essential to finding the optimal implemen-
tation strategy for the AML because it clarifies the roles and objectives of other aspects
of the Chinese economy with which the AML must coordinate.
154. See id. at 240.
155. See id.
156. See id.
157. See id. China has chosen to retreat from these sectors because they do not create
conditions of natural monopoly and are unregulated in other market economies. Reform
in these areas include dissolving government ministries that had complete control and
replacing them with chambers of commerce or trade associations, which only play a
regulatory role.
158. See id.
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National People’s Congress rejected an early draft of the AML.159 Oppo-
nents of the AML have argued that its underlying principles are only appli-
cable to well-developed market economies.160 In other words, these
opponents claim that the newness of China’s private sector and the pres-
ence of its Dual-Mode regulatory scheme mean that the government should
encourage the concentration of small enterprises rather than limit concen-
tration with a comprehensive antitrust law.161  As mentioned above, most
of China’s privately owned enterprises can be characterized as small to
medium sized.162 Opponents of the AML have used this point to argue that
China should not focus on anti-monopoly law because smaller enterprises
bring about fewer risks of abuse of power.163 This theory stresses that gov-
ernment interference through anti-monopoly law is unwarranted because
the government already has control of the enterprises that are big enough
to cause problems. The remaining private enterprises are too small to have
a significant impact on the operation of the market.164
However, opponents of the AML are mistaken in thinking that the
absence of giant private enterprises eliminates the need for the AML. The
objective of any antitrust law is to promote and maintain free market condi-
tions in the country in which the law is to operate.165 No matter how big or
small Chinese private enterprises are, they must still be subject to the pres-
sures of market competition in order to preserve consumers’ ability to
choose products and to promote proper functioning of the Socialist Market
Economy.166
Furthermore, the changes brought about by the 1992 reforms have
bolstered the case for the adoption of a coherent and comprehensive anti-
trust law.167  The need for the AML has thus not been diminished by
China’s Dual-Mode regulatory scheme. Rather, implementation of the AML
should be in line with China’s two aims of promoting a market economy in
some sectors while maintaining State control in other sectors.
III. China’s Legal Context
A. A Questionable Legal System
Perhaps the biggest challenge to the coherent implementation of the
AML is the uncertainty presented by China’s legal system. Enforcement of
159. Wang Xiaoye, Issues Surrounding the Drafting of China’s Anti-Monopoly Law, 3
WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 285, 292 (2004).
160. See id.
161. See id.
162. See Owen, supra note 1, at 239.
163. See Xiaoye, supra note 159.
164. See Owen, supra note 1, at 240. This theory assumes that the only purpose of
antitrust law is to check the power of large enterprises, such as General Motors or Ford.
See Xiaoye, supra note 159, at 293.
165. See Xiaoye, supra note 159, at 293.
166. See id.
167. See id. These changes include the elimination of price controls, the diversifica-
tion of enterprise ownership, and increased discretion for SOEs in managing economic
affairs.
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laws is often less than satisfactory because administrative agencies in
China are not transparent, predictable, or reliable.168 This is a significant
problem because the Anti-Monopoly Enforcement Agency is responsible
for enforcing the AML.169 A heavier burden should be shifted onto the
courts to ensure a full review of all relevant facts and legal principles, as
agencies cannot be counted on to correctly implement the AML.
However, having courts play a larger role in the implementation of the
AML will not resolve the Chinese legal system’s issues due to the poor qual-
ity of judicial review.170 Problems with judicial review of administrative
actions include the narrow scope and convoluted nature of review.171 Per-
haps the biggest problem, however, is the court system’s persistent bias in
favor of administrative agencies over individuals.172 This bias is of central
importance because giving courts the power and discretion to reverse the
decisions of administrative agencies would be a fruitless endeavor if the
courts continue to improperly favor the agency by agreeing with their deci-
sions. This bias is indicative of a larger problem known as administrative
monopoly.
B. The Administrative Monopoly
An administrative monopoly can be described as “monopolistic activi-
ties conducted by governmental bodies or their affiliated departments.”173
Some have argued that the administrative monopoly is the single most
important issue facing China today.174 The Chinese government’s corrupt
and non-transparent nature makes it susceptible to the evils of the adminis-
trative monopoly.175 The difficulty in dealing with the administrative
monopoly hinders China’s ability to balance the interests of government
influence and proper operation of a free-market economy by presenting the
constant threat that the government will make self-interested choices.176
The AML should not be expected to effectively address the administrative
monopoly issue on its own.177 However, the AML can offer a partial solu-
tion to the problem because
[T]he prohibitions on the abuse of power by the government in the Anti-
Monopoly Law are beneficial not only for government officials to distin-
guish between right and wrong, and legal and illegal, but also to improve the
awareness of these officials of anti-monopoly policies. From this perspective,
the Anti-Monopoly Law is not only an important tool to further economic
reform, but also a means to promote political reform in China.178
168. See Owen, supra note 1, at 242. R
169. See id.
170. See id. at 241.
171. See id.
172. See id.
173. Xiaoye, supra note 159, at 290.
174. See id.
175. See Owen, supra note 1, at 242. R
176. See Xiaoye, supra note 159, at 290.
177. See id.
178. See id.
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IV. Divergence From the U.S. Model and Real Role of SOEs
A. Different Economic and Regulatory Features Mean Different
Objectives for Antitrust Laws
One of the most significant differences between the structures of the
Chinese and U.S. economies is the presence of SOEs in China.  SOEs have
not had a significant presence in the U.S. since the massive privatization
movements following World War II. Thus, while the U.S. regulatory frame-
work can focus on promoting market competition, the Chinese regulatory
framework must focus on balancing the need for a competitive market with
a need to promote and sustain the growth of SOEs.179 In fact, this delicate
balancing objective is explicitly set out in the AML.180 The AML states:
In SOE-controlled sectors concerning the health of national economy and
national security and in sectors where state trading is authorized by law, the
legal operations of the enterprises are protected by law, yet the government
will supervise and regulate the prices of the goods and services provided by
those enterprises to protect the interests of consumers and promote technol-
ogy advancement.181
Furthermore, the AML seemingly points to self-discipline and self-reg-
ulation as two ways to keep SOEs from hurting the market economy when
it states that “[t]he enterprises referenced in the foregoing clause shall con-
duct businesses in accordance with law, be honest, exercise strict self-disci-
pline, and be subject to the supervision of the public. Those enterprises
shall not hurt the interests of consumers by virtue of their dominant status
or state trading status.”182 The AML— as compared to U.S. antitrust law—
demonstrates a wholly different end goal for Chinese antitrust law by set-
ting out a framework within China’s unique economy.
At first glance, China has two seemingly contradictory objectives for
SOEs. On one hand, it looks to rein in the monopolistic power of SOEs
through the adoption of the AML and other reforms; on the other hand, it
retains absolute control of SOEs in certain important sectors.183 However,
a closer look reveals that the continued presence of SOEs may benefit the
Chinese economy by providing stability in certain sectors and making up
for market imperfections through coordination. While the SOE system
clearly does not benefit free market competition, it is also not so hostile to
free market competition that it hurts the Chinese economy.184
179. See Owen, supra note 1, at 246. R
180. See id.
181. See Antimonopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 30, 2007, effective Aug. 1, 2008), translated
in and made available at http://www.china.org.cn/government/laws/2009-02/10/con
tent_17254169.htm.
182. See id.
183. See Owen, supra note 1, at 244. The question of how to address this issue con- R
tributed to the prolonged debate over the drafting of the AML. Owen also argues that
now that the AML has been enacted, balancing these two objectives will be a huge factor
in determining the overall effectiveness of the AML.
184. See id. at 244– 45.
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B. SOEs and the Free Market
Maintaining State ownership in certain sectors is not incompatible
with promoting a competitive market economy in other areas.185 In fact,
China has even promoted competition in areas with heavy State owner-
ship.186 For example, in the telecommunications industry, China has cre-
ated more competition by breaking up a large SOE into multiple entities.187
Thus, the idea that SOEs cannot co-exist with the market economy is
wrong.
State ownership of companies in an industry should not be equated with
conferring monopoly status on a particular company or a particular group
of companies. It is entirely possible to have State ownership of the compa-
nies in an industry, and yet to have the State ownership dispersed in dozens,
or even hundreds, of SOEs competing against each other and against private
firms. Furthermore, even if China were to decide to grant some type of
exclusive status— and thus market power— to the key SOEs in the strategic
sectors, such a decision need not be a license for the SOEs to abuse the
market power thus granted.188
The result of this setup is that SOEs will constantly have a large mar-
ket share and be powerful, but antitrust authorities will not allow them to
abuse their power in ways that completely stifle competition.189
Even though China’s economic and regulatory contexts include the
distinctive feature of SOEs, the presence of these enterprises does not mean
that China’s economy is so different from the U.S. economy that China
cannot look to the U.S. for guidance in establishing and implementing anti-
trust law.
C. Differences Are Not Determinative: U.S. Antitrust Law Is Still
Helpful to China
A detailed analysis of China’s economic, regulatory, and legal schemes
reveal that the AML must operate in a context that differs greatly from the
context in which U.S. antitrust law must operate. However, that does not
mean that China cannot take cues from U.S. antitrust law in finding the
best way to apply its own antitrust law.190 The principles guiding U.S. anti-
trust law have changed along with shifting societal values when it comes to
promoting competition.191 Thus, the real purpose of U.S. antitrust law is to
185. See id.
186. See id. at 245.
187. See id.
188. See id. at 244– 45.
189. See id.
190. In fact, China has already taken cues from the United States in drafting the AML.
See Howell et al., supra note 120, at 56.
191. See Joshua D. Wright, The Antitrust/Consumer Protection Paradox: Two Policies at
War with Each Other, 121 YALE L.J. 2216, 2234 (2012). Fear of big business motivated
the first half-century of decisions following the enactment of the Sherman Act. Thus,
internal inconsistencies came about as a result of courts attempting to find any way to
rule against big business. These internal inconsistencies declined with the rise of the
“Chicago School” of antitrust economics. The Chicago School was less concerned with
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promote policies that fit with the rest of the country’s regulatory frame-
work to preserve desired market conditions.192 China should follow the
path of the U.S. and implement the AML in a way that is coherent with the
rest of its regulatory framework.
V. China Should Follow U.S. Antitrust Law and Adopt the Rule of
Reason for Vertical Price-Fixing Cases
A. U.S. Antitrust Law Has Moved Toward the Rule of Reason for RPM
Cases
The Supreme Court completed the long transition from per se analysis
of RPM cases to using the rule of reason with Leegin.193 Previously, Dr.
Miles was the governing case for vertical price-fixing cases involving
RPMs.194 For almost a century, Dr. Miles held that RPM schemes were per
se illegal.195 However, Leegin, the original defendant who had implemented
RPM, used an argument based on progressive economic research to con-
vince the Court to finally overrule Dr. Miles.196
In the majority opinion, Justice Kennedy framed the issue as whether
courts should abandon the per se rule when analyzing RPMs in the face of
economic evidence that these restraints can have pro-competitive
effects.197 Justice Kennedy went on to explain the difference between the
per se rule and the rule of reason in simple terms. He stated that resort to
the per se rule is “confined to restraints . . . that would always or almost
always tend to restrict competition and decrease output.198 On the other
hand, the rule of reason “distinguishes between restraints with anticompe-
titive effect that are harmful to the consumer and restraints stimulating
competition that are in the consumer’s best interest.”199
After a brief overview of the Dr. Miles case, Justice Kennedy concluded
that the rationales relied upon by the holding of the case do not justify use
the structure-conduct-performance simplification of economic analysis and ushered in a
renaissance of economic research to establish a new framework for legal analysis of
economic actors.
192. See Xiaoye, supra note 159, at 293 (stating that the purpose of any antitrust law
is to promote free market competition within its own country).
193. See Dresnick, supra note 20, at 230– 31. R
194. See id.
195. See Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 374, overruled by Leegin, 551 U.S. at 877.
196. See Dresnick, supra note 20, at 237. Leegin argued that the reasoning of the Dr. R
Miles case conflicted with modern economic understanding. Leegin pointed out that per
se analysis should apply only when a practice always, or almost always, results in anti-
competitive effects.  The defendant also focused on the pro-competitive effects of RPMs,
such as promoting interbrand competition by improving retail services and thereby forc-
ing manufacturers to compete on more than just price. See Dresnick, supra note 20, at R
240. PSKS countered and argued that the principle of stare decisis should control the
case, especially because the doctrine was at its strongest when dealing with interpreta-
tion of statutes like the Sherman Act. See Dresnick, supra note 19, at 240.
197. See Dresnick, supra note 20, at 243. R
198. See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 886.
199. Id.
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of the per se rule.200 The Court then proceeded to examine the economic
effects of vertical price-fixing.201 The Court acknowledged that manufac-
turers have ample pro-competitive justifications for establishing RPM
schemes, such as promotion of inter-brand competition and eliminating
the free-rider problem.202 The court also recognized that RPMs are not
devoid of the potential to create unlawful and anticompetitive conduct. For
example, the court stated that RPMs can function as a disguise for manu-
facturer or retailer cartels.203 However, the fact that RPMs can create
equally compelling pro-competitive effects lessened the concerns for these
possible anti-competitive effects.204
The Court then addressed the issue of stare decisis. Justice Kennedy
pointed out that the Sherman Act had always been treated as a common
law statute.205 Thus, the statute was intended to be a flexible standard,
which could change over time with changing circumstances.206 Further-
more, Justice Kennedy observed that Dr. Miles was decided not long after
the passage of the Sherman Act, at a time when there was little knowledge
of the Act’s precedential powers.207 Consequently, Justice Kennedy ruled
that the principle of stare decisis did not compel a continued adherence to
the application of the per se rule against vertical price restraints in the face
of newfound economic evidence that these restraints can have pro-competi-
tive effects.208
B. China Should Also Apply the Rule of Reason for RPM Cases
The rule of reason is still the appropriate approach for dealing with
RPMs under the AML, even though the rule might give even more discretion
and power to government officials who hold the administrative monopoly.
The rule of reason is the correct principle to apply in light of China’s eco-
nomic and regulatory contexts because it gives the government flexibility
as it pursues its two aims of freeing up certain sectors to market pressures
while keeping State control over essential sectors.
While the per se rule could set out bright-line rules that bring more
certainty and stability to the legal and administrative processes, the rule is
a bad fit for the interplay between China’s economic structure and regula-
tory scheme.209 Courts applying the per se rule would condemn all RPM
200. See id.
201. See Dresnick, supra note 20, at 244. R
202. See id.
203. See id.
204. See id.
205. See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 889.
206. See Dresnick, supra note 20, at 246. R
207. See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 900.
208. See id. Because the principle of stare decisis did not dictate implementation of the
per se rule, the Court was free to take the new economic evidence into account and
either continue to adhere to the per se rule or declare that the rule of reason is now
appropriate for analyzing vertical price-fixing schemes.
209. See Piraino, Jr., supra note 25, at 691. The per se rule was developed as a R
response to the inefficiencies of antitrust litigation. It provides clear guidance to busi-
nesses and also to courts trying to decide antitrust cases.
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tactics as illegal without analyzing their possible pro-competitive effects.210
Consequently, Chinese courts will strike down RPM schemes that either
promote inter-brand competition or eliminate the free-rider problem.211
Clearly, this rigid application of the AML is not coherent with China’s cur-
rent regulatory scheme, which consists of differing policy aims depending
on the circumstances of the enterprise.212
C. Conclusion: Chinese Courts Got it Right in Johnson & Johnson
As illustrated above, the ultimate goal of any antitrust law is to pro-
mote and maintain free market conditions in its country of origin.213 The
task becomes more difficult when working within China’s Dual-Mode regu-
latory framework. In addition to preserving competitive market conditions,
the AML is tasked with the responsibility of checking the power of the State
controlled enterprises. Chinese courts should follow the decision in John-
son & Johnson and apply the rule of reason in future RPM cases because the
rule provides the flexibility necessary to balance China’s Dual-Mode regu-
latory scheme.
Johnson & Johnson contained a classic vertical price-fixing scheme.214
Johnson & Johnson included a resale price minimum in its contract with
Rainbow.215 After Rainbow ignored Johnson & Johnson’s warnings to stop
bidding below the minimum resale price for medical supply contracts,
Johnson & Johnson ended their fifteen-year business relationship with
Rainbow.216 Rainbow thus sued Johnson & Johnson, alleging damages of
the equivalent of $2.3 million.217
The Shanghai High Court applied the Rule of Reason in analyzing
Johnson & Johnson’s RPM scheme.218 This allowed the court to take a
deeper look into the actual essence of the agreement and weigh the pro-
competitive benefits that the RPM agreement could bring against any anti-
competitive effects.219  In doing so, the Shanghai High Court followed the
U.S. model of dealing with vertical price-fixing schemes.220 As previously
discussed, this is the correct decision because it allows the Chinese govern-
ment to be flexible in pursuing its two aims of freeing up certain sectors to
market pressures while keeping State control over essential sectors. This
210. See PITOFSKY ET AL., supra note 7, at 607 (listing the pro-competitive effects for R
vertical price-fixing and RPMs).
211. See id.
212. See Xiaoye, supra note 159, at 293. The goal of any antitrust law is to maintain
market competition in its own country. Thus, implementation of the AML must be
coherent within China’s unique economic, regulatory, and legal frameworks.
213. See id.
214. See Kaufman, supra note 128.
215. See id.
216. See id.
217. See id.
218. See Shanghai Court, supra note 10.
219. See id. Some of the factors that the court considered were the level of competition
in the marketplace, the relative negotiating power of the parties, the strength of the
brand, and the defendant’s market share.
220. See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 889.
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decision is not the end of the discussion for this topic because Chinese
court decisions are not binding.221 However, this decision by the Shanghai
High Court represents a step in the right direction.
221. See Shanghai Court, supra note 10.
